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THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: IN SEARCH OF EQUITY
JAMES E. PANNY* and MARC L. FAUST*
The authors review decisions made under Section 6013(e) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and conclude that this section has
not provided the relief which its enactors intended. They suggest
a more liberal reading of this section, so that decisions made will
comport with the remedial nature of the statute. The authors also
recommend a legislative revision of this section.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The general rule when a husband and wife file a joint return is
that each is jointly and severally liable for any deficiencies or penal-
ties.' Prior to the addition of subsection (e) to section 6013 of the
Internal Revenue Code, liability was automatic. The majority of the
courts would not even consider a claim of innocence by one of the
two parties.2
These courts, though noting the harshness of the results, chose
to take an inflexible approach to the apparently clear mandate of
the statute. In the words of the Tax Court in Louise M. Scudder,3
Former Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
** Former Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) reads: "if a joint return is made, the tax shall be computed on the
aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several."
2. "[A] husband and wife filing a joint return were automatically jointly and severally
liable for income tax deficiencies and fraud penalties incurred even though the deficiencies
and penalties were due to misstatement by one spouse and the other spouse was innocent."
United States v. Zimmerman, 478 F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1973).
3. 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968).
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"the inflexible statute leaves no room for amelioration."' Gradually,
a minority of courts became appalled at the harshness of the results
and granted relief to the so-called "innocent spouse."5 Some courts
resorted to fictions in allowing relief to innocent spouses. Realizing
that the "only way [a spouse] could have avoided liability, accord-
ing to the Tax Court, would have been to have proven that [the
spouse] had not filed the returns jointly with [the guilty spouse],",
some courts resorted to questionable defenses such as mistake,7 du-
ress' and fraud or trickery9 in order to relieve an innocent spouse
from liability. For the vast majority, however, relief was unavail-
able.
Finally, in 1971, subsection (e) was added to section 6013 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.' 0 This so-called "innocent spouse"
provision grants relief if certain requirements are met: (1) a joint
return must be filed; (2) there must be an omission from gross
income attributable to the "guilty" spouse; (3) the omission must
constitute an amount in excess of 25 percent of the amount stated
in gross income; (4) the innocent spouse must establish that he/she
neither had knowledge of the omission nor "reason to know" of it;
and (5) the court must consider all the facts and circumstances
(most notably, whether the innocent spouse "significantly bene-
fited" from the omission) and decide whether it would be inequita-
ble to hold the innocent spouse liable.
4. Id. at 41.
5. E.g., Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969); Scudder v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Cooper, 71-1 TAX CT. REP. (CCH) §
9321 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 1971).
6. Note, The Innocent Wife and Joint Tax Returns, 22 ALA. L. REV. 591 (1970).
7. Payne v. United States, 247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957).
8. Lola I. Brown, 51 T.C. 116 (1968).
9. Marie A. Dolan, 44 T.C. 420 (1965) (dictum).
10. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) reads:
(e) Spouse Relieved of Liability in Certain Cases.-
(1) In general-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable year
and on such return there was omitted from gross income an amount
properly includable therein which is attributable to one spouse and
which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated
in the return.
(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she
did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission, and
(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse significantly
benefited directly or indirectly from the items omitted from gross
income and taking into account all other facts and circumstances, it
is inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax
for such taxable year attributable to such omission, then the other
spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penal-
ties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such
liability is attributable to such omission from gross income.
[Vol. 32:137
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"The legislative history of this section indicates that it was
designed to bring government tax collection practices into accord
with basic principles of equity and fairness."" While relief has been
granted to more spouses than was possible under prior law, there
still remains a significant gap between practice and principle. Un-
fortunately many truly innocent spouses still are denied relief.
This comment will analyze the existing law, giving attention to
current deficiencies. From the brief description of the prerequisites
to relief noted above, it is clear that there is room for judicial con-
struction of specific terms. What is an "omission"? When will a
court find that a spouse "had reason to know" of an omission? What
factors become important in finding such inquiry notice? What is a
"significant benefit"? When will it be "inequitable" to hold an in-
nocent spouse liable? The answers are not clear. The authors also
will show the interrelationship between some of the "independent"
requirements. Finally, the authors will propose a more equitable
test for absolving an innocent spouse from deficiency liability. This
new test appears necessary since the implementation of section
6013(e) has resulted in a reversal by the courts of their trend toward
finding some leeway for equitable results. That is, the courts have
reverted to a strictly literal reading of the statute with little or no
opportunity to act in an equitable manner when the situation re-
quires statutory interpretation.'"
It should be noted at the outset that section 6013(e) relates to
basic liability for deficiencies. With the addition of this section,
other changes make it possible for the not-so-innocent spouse to be
relieved from penalties, such as those for fraud, even though he or
she may still remain liable for the basic deficiency. 3
In this area, as in any area of the law, the question of who bears
the burden of proof is of utmost importance. It will become manifest
that this is critical, especially since one of the parties is required to
be "without knowledge."
11. United States v. Dioguardi, 350 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
12. The usual response by the courts to new situations is to state simply that Congress
has called for a strict construction of section 6013(e). E.g., Ann J. Anderson, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 508, 515 (1975).
13. I.R.C. § 6653(b) reads in part:
If any part of any underpayment (as defined in subsection (c) of tax required to
be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to 50 percent of the underpayment. . . .In the case of a joint return under
section 6013, this subsection shall not apply with respect to the tax of a spouse
unless some part of the underpayment is due to the fraud of such spouse.
19771
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II. JOINT RETURN-COMMUNITY PROPERTY CASES
The requirement that a joint return be filed becomes an issue
primarily where the taxpayers are residents of community property
states. Due to the peculiarities of that form of property law, income
otherwise attributable to only one spouse becomes part of the in-
cludable income of an innocent spouse even though separate returns
are filed. The Code has a special rule in this regard which provides
that "the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross in-
come (other than gross income from property) are attributable shall
be made without regard to community property laws. ... '1 What
this means is that income from, for example, a husband's job will
be attributable to him alone for 6013(e) purposes even though state
law will give the wife title to one-half of the income. This special
rule for community property inhabitants, however, does not resolve
the problem of lack of a joint return. In fact, inequities are still
present in this area. In the case of Bettie Jayne Coffman, 15 for exam-
ple, the husband and wife were separated for the tax year in ques-
tion. The 25 percent requirement was met, the spouse had no knowl-
edge and derived no benefit. The Commissioner sought to hold the
spouse liable for failure to include on her separate return that por-
tion of her husband's income which, under the state's community
property laws, was attributable to her, The equities pointed toward
relief from liability. The "innocent" spouse was unable to invoke
section 6013(e) because separate returns were filed, but the wife
became liable as Texas, their domicile, is a community property
state.
"The statute simply does not provide relief where a separate
return was filed,"'" is the response of the courts. The Tax Court has
once again reverted to the often inequitable "strict construction"
theory from which a few courts had revolted just prior to the enact-
ment of section 6013(e).17
Mary Lou Gallihers is another case pointing out the inequities
of the requirement that a joint return be filed. This case involved a
broken marriage which ended in divorce in the year following the
tax year in question. Once again Texas community property law
created the still-existent inequity. The petitioner was found to have
no specific knowledge concerning her husband's income for the year
14. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A).
15. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1974).
16. Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760, 763 (1974).
17. See cases cited in note 3, supra.
18. 62 T.C. 760 (1974).
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in question. "Petitioner did not significantly benefit from the in-
come earned . . and was under the care of physicians and physi-
cally unable to work or participate in his activities in that year."' 9
Even though the petitioner had filed a separate return, she argued
for the application of section 6013(e) in "view of the remedial nature
of the statute and the similarity of the inequity it addresses to her
case." 0 The court rejected her argument while pointing out that
"[i]t is true that in noncommunity property States the situation
in the case at bar would not arise."'21
Petitioner also mounted an equal protection attack on the stat-
ute due to the operation of the community property laws. The court
also rejected this argument while noting that "the Supreme Court
long ago upheld the. constitutionality of distinctions arising from
community property laws. '2 2 Strict construction again prevailed.
Another problem arises in community property cases because
gross income from property is not treated as attributable to only the
"guilty" spouse. The inequity occurs where the "innocent" spouse
has little or nothing to do with the actual generation of such in-
come.23 In Allen v. Commissioner24 the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
rule laid out by the Tax Court below that "where omitted income
is generated by the performance of substantial services by one
spouse, that income should be attributed to that spouse for purposes
of section 6013(e)(1). ' ' 25 This seems to be in accord with Congres-
sional intent as to this phrase.26 Exactly just what is meant by
"substantial services" opens up another issue which the court in
Allen was able to avoid by finding that the petitioner had failed the
test.
27
Another issue stemming from the joint return requirement
arises when only one of the two spouses signs the return. This does
not mean that there is no "joint return." Rather, if the non-signing
spouse intended that a joint return be filed, a court will so hold. For
example, in Daniel Cecere,'2 a return for the tax year in question was
filed in the names of both spouses. The wife, however, did not sign
19. Id. at 761.
20. Id. at 761-62.
21. Id. at 762.
22. Id. at 763, citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117, 118 (1930).
23. See, e.g., Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 913 (emphasis added).
26. S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
27. In Allen, this argument failed primarily because petitioner did not offer any evidence
to support her proposition. 514 F.2d at 913. The importance of who bears the burden of proof
will be discussed in more detail in section VI, infra.
28. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1975).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the return. In finding the necessary intent to file a joint return, the
court considered the fact that the nonsigning wife's income and
deductions were included in the tax return. 9
III. KNOWLEDGE OF INNOCENT SPOUSE
A. Actual Knowledge
In order to be relieved from liability, the innocent spouse claim-
ant must establish that he or she had no actual knowledge of the
"guilty" spouse's activities.' Even if it can be established that the
innocent spouse had no actual knowledge, this does not, of course,
end the analysis as to the innocent spouse's knowledge. The claim-
ant still shoulders the additional responsibility of showing no
"reason to know" of the omission from gross income."
In a case where the claimant spouse is shown to have actual
knowledge the courts will go no further with their analysis. In
Herbert I. Joss,3" the "guilty" wife's third husband sought relief
from a tax deficiency liability. The wife's divorce decree from her
second marriage continued, in effect, a separation agreement call-
ing for her to receive $23,000 per year until death or remarriage.
While married to petitioner, the wife continued to receive $23,000
for the tax year in question. Petitioner's claim that this was a gift
because there was no obligation was rejected by the court,33 thus
probably determining the result as far as the section 6013(e) ques-
tion was concerned. His testimony, in revealing his knowledge of
the existence of the receipt of funds, alone was sufficient to pre-
clude relief. 4
While it is not necessary to investigate the area of knowledge
once it has been determined that there was no omission, some courts
have followed up their analysis by stating that where an amount is
mentioned, this alone demonstrates knowledge. For example, in
Georgiana Spaulder, 35 the tax deficiency resulted from an erroneous
claim of a deduction. The court quickly resolved this issue with the
29. Id. at 1599.
30. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B).
31. Id.
32. 56 T.C. 378 (1971).
33. Id. at 383, 385.
34. Id. at 388. This case points toward the real hardship in this area and the fact that
inequities still exist. While petitioner may have known of the receipt, there is testimony to
the effect that he attempted to persuade his wife to return the funds. Also, petitioner had
substantial savings of his own. Id. at 382. "Petitioner never received any cash from checks
drawn on Gwendolyn's account during [the tax year] or any other direct funds from Gwendo-
lyn." Id. at 381. There was clearly no benefit, let alone a significant one, but petitioner was
still assessed a deficiency.
35. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 723 (1972).
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remark that since there was a deduction on the return, it cannot be
said that the claimant did not have knowledge."
Actual knowledge is easily found where it is established that the
spouse claiming innocence was physically present at a place where
a transaction giving rise to a deficiency took place. In Alfred
Altman, 7 the claimant's husband received a large sum of money
from his mother. After determining that the transfer did not amount
to a gift, the court noted that the claimant wife was present during
the transaction. Presence amounted to knowledge, and relief was
denied. 8 This alone "is sufficient to prevent [claimant's] being
entitled to the relief provided for in section 6013(e)."39
Besides mere presence, there are several cases where claimants
were denied relief because of a more active participation in either
the actual generation of the funds in question or the subsequent
handling thereof. In Cecelia M. Harmon,40 the husband and wife
(the innocent spouse claimant) conducted two small businesses.
The wife operated a liquor store which was directly across the street
from the car repair shop which her husband ran. Funds emanating
from the repair business were omitted from the joint return for the
tax year in question. The wife made out the bank deposit slips for
both businesses. From this fact it necessarily followed that she had
knowledge. Consequently section 6013(e) relief was denied."
In Clarence E. Haywood,4" the wife's claim for section 6Q13(e)
relief was frustrated by several factors. First, she helped her hus-
band to cash postal money orders which he had converted from his
employer. Second, she was a practicing accountant and bookkeeper
and had played an active role in preparing the tax returns from
which the converted monies were omitted.
This case, as do many others,43 involved a truly "guilty" spouse
who was primarily responsible for the subject omission. The hus-
band was engaging in a fairly complex scheme of embezzling funds
from his employer. The company used postal meters; when they
were due to be reset, he obtained a check from the company in
excess of the amount due the post office. He would receive the excess
in the form of money orders and stamps which he subsequently
36. Id. at 724.
37. 31 T.C.M. 91 (1972).
38. Id. at 96.
39. Id.
40. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1974).
41. Id. at 437.
42. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1974).
43. E.g. Doris Swofford, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 691 (1975) (gambling); Daniel Cecere, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1975) (extortion).
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converted to his own use. The money was then spent by both
spouses in casinos, bars, race tracks and other "vacation" activities.
Most importantly, however, the innocent spouse claimant, on at
least two occasions, actively participated by cashing postal money
orders for her husband by placing her name on the orders as pur-
chaser and then returned the money to him. In light of this, the
court decided that it could not "accept petitioner's testimony that
she did not know that her husband had others [sic] sources of
income . ..which were not reflected on their joint returns."' , By
way of explanation, the court listed four specific reasons for its
finding of knowledge: (1) she handled the family financial affairs,
including preparation of the joint returns; (2) she wrote checks and
paid the bills; (3) she was an accountant; and (4) she saw her hus-
band cash money orders in large amounts. Her active participation
combined with her particular expertise to preclude recovery.
Daniel Cecere"l was another case in which a claim of innocence
was not supported by the record. Here, however, denial of relief was
based on the petitioner's inability to show that she had not bene-
fited significantly from the unreported income." The case is some-
what of an anomaly in that the knowledge issue was disposed of
rather summarily when the court believed her testimony as to
knowledge and ruled accordingly. 7 At other times, a court will take
great care in determining the issue by examining various factors to
determine not only actual knowledge but inquiry knowledge as
well."
Predictably, it is not always easy to determine if a court is
really talking about inquiry knowledge when it says it finds full
knowledge or vice versa. In Doris Swofford," the "guilty" husband
was involved in the operation of a gambling organization. Under the
previous cases, it would be easy to find actual knowledge through
active participation. The claimant was seen on at least two occa-
sions participating in the "cut-loose" which was an integral part of
her husband's operation. The court held that the wife had "full
knowledge" of omissions, therefore she was not an innocent spouse.50
The court went further, though, and considered other factors.
44. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1316.
45. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1975).
46. The innocent spouse claimant failed to meet her burden of proving that she did not
significantly benefit from the omitted income.
47. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1599-1600.
48. Of course, exactly how much evidence a petitioner must present on this issue is hard
to predict. Here, petitioner's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient. Usually it is not. This
will be discussed in greater detail in the section on burden of proof, infra.
49. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 691 (1975).
50. Id. at 695.
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It was noted that the innocent spouse claimant had control of sev-
eral checking accounts in their home area. The Service had acquired
the checks for goods and services and also had garnered knowledge
as to cash payments for various items. The court noted as a factor
in its decision that "petitioner deposited and expended more funds
than she had available from her savings and earnings."'" Although
unnecessary, it seems that "inquiry notice" was also found.
One thing is clear. A finding of actual knowledge ends the in-
quiry.52 If the requirement that the claimant have no actual knowl-
edge is established he or she must go on to the next step, which is
to establish that he or she had no "reason to know" of the omission. 3
B. Inquiry Notice
The innocent spouse claimant must establish that he had no
reason to know of the omission. Many factors are found in the var-
ious cases in this area and the authors will here attempt to show
which are important and what combinations may or may not tilt the
equities one way or the other. Most confusing, however, is the fact
that the courts are not very consistent in their approach. That is,
the same set of factors appearing in two cases will sometimes lead
to contrasting results with the onerous burden of proof often becom-
ing the most crucial of all the "factors."
In 1975, the Tax Court decided Ann J. Anderson.5" In this un-
usual case the court discussed many of the older factors, and, in
addition, brought a new factor to the fore. The Commissioner de-
termined tax deficiencies for the years 1969 and 1970 on joint re-
turns. Petitioner sought relief, under the "innocent spouse" provi-
sion of section 6013(e), from liability for these deficiencies. The
Tax Court properly considered each year separately. In 1969 peti-
tioner had neither knowledge nor reason to know of her husband's
illegal activities.5 However, Mrs. Anderson was held to have been
put on notice in 1970.56
Over a period of time petitioner's husband had embezzled a
significant sum of money from his employer. 7 Failure to report these
sums led to the deficiencies in question. During the second of the
51. Id.
52. A finding that petitioner was aware of items of gross income not being reported was
sufficient to preclude relief. Id. at 695 n.16.
53. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B).
54. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1975).
55. Id. at 513.
56. Id. at 515.
57. Petitioner's husband originally owned the company and stayed on as an employee
when he sold out to a third party. Id. at 509.
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tax years in question petitioner's husband was discharged from his
job and later that same year he was indicted for embezzlement. The
court's finding, that in this year petitioner had knowledge and in-
quiry notice of the omission, is unfair although it is predictable.
In its examination of petitioner's claims the court noted that
petitioner was not an active participant in the company's affairs.
"Petitioner was not familiar with the business operations of [the
company]." 5 The court noted that she was a school teacher and
had never seen a business checkbook. The first factor, then, would
appear to weigh in favor of finding no reason to know.
The next factor considered was involvement with the family's
finances. Petitioner and her husband had a joint checking account.
Mrs. Anderson wrote most of the checks but she did not keep the
records. Her husband had his own personal checking account which
he utilized to handle the company's business operations. Petitioner
too had her own personal checking account, and when her husband
was fired she used her personal account to pay all of the bills. None
of the embezzled money was placed in an account over which peti-
tioner had control. The returns in question were prepared by a third
party. Petitioner signed the returns without examining them. These
factors weigh in favor of a finding that petitioner had no reason to
know of the omissions.
After stating the basic facts, the court analyzed the 1969 activi-
ties first. The court accepted the testimony of Mrs. Anderson and
her husband that she had no actual knowledge of the omission." The
next logical step was determining if she had reason to know of the
omission.
Here the court looked to what can be considered the third "fac-
tor" of the case-standard of living in the community with reference
to reported income. Since there was no serious discrepancy between
standard of living and reported income" this factor could not be
used to charge petitioner with knowledge. "The Andersons' stan-
dard of living during 1969 was in line with reported income for that
year and was comparable to that of other families in the community
with similar incomes."'" The court specifically listed five "subfac-
tors" which supported petitioner's contention that she was without
inquiry notice: (1) petitioner put trust and confidence in her hus-
band as to financial matters; (2) petitioner only had access to funds
necessary to maintain the household; (3) the Andersons made only
58. Id.
59. Id. at 512-13.
60. The couple did spend approximately $500 more than reported income. Id. at 510-11.
61. Id. at 513.
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modest expenditures on gifts; (4) the family residence was modest,
heavily financed, and no improvements had been made; and (5) the
family car was a 2 year-old Chevrolet.
The court found that in 1969 petitioner had no reason to know
of the omission of the embezzled funds. Analysis for 1970 followed
and all the listed factors remained present. One additional factor,
however, tilted the scales toward inquiry notice.
Again, the court accepted petitioner's testimony that she had
no actual knowledge at the time she signed the 1970 joint return.
However, her husband had been indicted in November of 1970 for
embezzling from his employer. At this time she may not have been
put on notice because "Anderson assured petitioner that the money
remained in the business, or had been reinvested in the business,
and petitioner received this same assurance from Anderson when-
ever she attempted to discuss the matter with him." 2 It is pre-
sumed, in light of the court's willingness to accept her naked testi-
mony as to actual notice, that the indictment alone may not have
been sufficient to put petitioner on notice of the omission. Addi-
tional elements, however, led the court to hold against petitioner.
During the summer of 1970, because she feared that her hus-
band's former employer would try to take possession of their home,
petitioner asked her husband to transfer to her his interest in the
house which they then held as tenants by the entireties. In July,
1970, Mr. Anderson transferred to petitioner his interest in the
house. 3 Early the next year, before petitioner signed the 1970 tax
return, Mr. Anderson pled nolo contendere to the charge of embez-
zlement. The court ruled that these facts precluded relief since peti-
tioner must show that there were no "facts within [her] knowledge
from which a reasonably prudent taxpayer. . . would have known
of the omission."6 4
The significance of the indictment as reason to know of omitted
income lies in the fact that the Tax Court stated that it was a case
of first impression; however, the ruling did not turn on the fact of
indictment because considerable reliance was placed on the fact of
conviction.
Petitioner's assertion that he (sic) was convinced by Anderson
that the money remained in the business, or had been reinvested
in the business, does not convince us that she had no reason to
know of the omission. . . .While petitioner may have been con-
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. at 514.
64. Id. at 515.
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vinced by this explanation originally, we cannot accept her con-
tinued reliance on such a sketchy explanation in light of her
husband's conviction. '
It appears that the question remains open as to whether an indict-
ment alone gives someone reason to know of omitted income. This
is especially so where the innocent spouse claimant receives plausi-
ble explanations that the funds in question have not in fact bene-
fited the couple.
At first, conviction appears to be a sure indicator of reason to
know of omissions. But what of a conviction following a plea of nolo
contendere? This is not an admission of guilt. There are many rea-
sons why an otherwise innocent person may plead no contest (for
example, expectations of a lighter sentence or the fact that the
accused does not have an alibi). It may have been easy to find
reason to know in the instant case, but courts which consider this
question should at least make a preliminary inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the plea.
In Patricia S. Hayes,66 the husband gained income from various
individuals in the course of his business dealings which was not
reported on the couple's joint returns for the years 1963, 1964, and
1965. After stating that it was "convinced by the petitioner's testi-
mony that she did not actually know of the omission of such in-
come," 7 the court found that the innocent spouse claimant had no
reason to know of the omissions.
In coming to this conclusion the court considered a number of
factors including the wife's business acumen. It recognized that
although she had only completed the tenth grade, she had some
familiarity with business matters and had taken a number of book-
keeping courses at vocational school. Although the court did not
address this matter specifically it would appear that the claimant
spouse's business acumen should be a factor in assessing whether a
particular set of facts should lead the spouse to conclude that some-
thing is amiss. It is submitted that, ordinarily, this would be one of
several factors that a court should discuss when confronted with the
primary issue.
The court also considered whether there was active participa-
tion. Mrs. Hayes was aware of some of the people who had business
dealings with her husband and, in some cases, was generally aware
of the transactions involved. "However, the details of these transac-
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975).
67. Id. at 981.
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tions, which appear to be complex in some cases, were not revealed
to her."" The court declared that this did not put her on notice."
The family finances aspect likewise was resolved in the peti-
tioner's favor. Mrs. Hayes did in fact control the "family" checking
account and she kept other financial records, and "[n]othing in the
accounting mechanism involved in handling and balancing the per-
sonal checking account and in sorting income from expenses would
bring to the petitioner's attention the unreported business income
of [her husband]."7" While petitioner may not have been totally
naive, the court reaffirmed the principle that: "Complete knowledge
of the family's finances is not required of the petitioner."71
The court briefly considered the spouses' standard of living in
the community and found that no evidence was presented as to
lavish or unusual expenditures. Thus, there was no extravagance
which might put petitioner on notice that there might be unreported
income. This factor, then, was also in favor of the innocent spouse
claimant.
In Ann J. Anderson the court discussed whether a wife had
reason to know of unreported income because of her husband's in-
dictment and conviction on an embezzlement charge. 2 In this light
it is interesting to note that Mrs. Hayes was aware that her husband
was being investigated by the Internal Revenue Service. 3 This
knowledge even caused her to question the expenses and income for
the year. The accountants who prepared the return satisfied her
that everything was in order. The Tax Court decided that these
facts were insufficient to put Mrs. Hayes on notice. This would
appear inconsistent with the Anderson case which can be read as
stating that a mere indictment is equivalent to inquiry notice. It is
submitted, however, that since conviction was the true basis for
denial of relief in that case, the Hayes court's approach of apparent
satisfaction following inquiries is logically consistent and equitable
in result.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had occasion to discuss seven factors in granting relief to an inno-
cent spouse in Sanders v. United States.74 The wife in this case paid
68. Id.
69. "Complexity of the transaction" is an important factor in many of the cases in this
area. Here, however, it was merely mentioned briefly, apparently since the issue of knowledge
was disposed of without having to reach the issue of complexity.
70. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 981.
71. Id.
72. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1975); see text accompanying notes 62-65, supra.
73. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 981.
74. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
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assessed deficiencies of over $30,000 for the tax years 1968 and 1969.
She then successfully brought suit for a refund in district court. 5
The seven factors can be summarized as follows: (1) The finan-
cial affairs of the claimant's husband were complex; in fact, it took
the Internal Revenue Service a great deal of time to unravel them.
(2) The wife's subjective condition lessened her awareness of the
importance of the facts before her. She had a high school education
and had devoted her life to being a housewife. She also suffered from
severe emotional problems and her heavy use of alcohol com-
pounded these difficulties. (3) Petitioner's husband rarely confided
in her regarding his business affairs. (4) The petitioner placed great
trust and reliance in their accountant, whom she had recommended
to her husband. (5) The wife's participation was without any actual
knowledge. Although the petitioner typed letters for her husband
regarding transactions resulting in unreported income, she was an
experienced typist who typed without comprehending the material.
(6) The claimant did handle the family finances through balancing
the checkbooks and there was a large deposit in excess of reported
income. The court did not consider this sufficient to convey notice,
however. (7) Although there were expenditures which on their face
would seem lavish or unusual, when balanced against the family's
standard of living, petitioner did not have reason to know of the
omission.
This last point is of particular interest. The court's exact phras-
ing was: "One person's luxury can be another's necessity, and the
lavishness of an expense must be measured from each family's rela-
tive level of ordinary support."76 The innocent spouse claimant was
not put on notice because "the Sanders were apparently enjoying a
fairly high and generally improving standard of living."" During the
years in question, the Sanders acquired a new home and made inte-
rior and exterior improvements. They bought new and expensive
cars in each year. They made gambling trips to Las Vegas and
purchased a new condominium in the Bahamas. Apparently the rich
are permitted much greater enjoyment of unreported income before
they are charged with notice.
One other noteworthy point coming from the case is the court's
acceptance of the fact that there is a subjective element involved,
despite the fact that the test is purported to be the well-renowned
"reasonable man" standard, which is supposedly objective in na-
75. 369 F.Supp. 160 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
76. 509 F.2d at 168.
77. Id.
[Vol. 32:137
INNOCENT SPOUSE
ture.75 "[T]he state of the spouse's cognitive faculties becomes a
permissible inquiry."79 Thus, whenever the reasonable man test is
urged upon the court by the Service, the practitioner can use this
case to induce the court to implement a subjective approach. Fur-
thermore, the use of the "complexity factor" makes sense. It would
be incongruous to note that after years of inconclusive inquiry and
expert analysis by the Service, a mere housewife should be held to
have reason to know of omitted income.
One of the most often cited cases on innocent spouse relief is
Patricia E. Mysse.11 The "guilty" spouse was a managing officer and
cashier in a small town bank in Montana. He also had a small
insurance agency. As in most of the innocent spouse cases, he was
an embezzler, having taken approximately $105,000 from 1963
through 1966. The husband and petitioner-wife had a joint checking
account from which they made withdrawals for support of the fam-
ily." Between 1963 and 1966, in addition to these support expenses,
the "guilty" husband paid the income taxes, the college expenses
for two sons, mortgage payments on the home, and the cost of mer-
chandise on charge accounts. He also bought a Jaguar and four
Oldsmobiles for the couple and their three sons, along with a dia-
mond ring, furniture and clothing-all on an average reported in-
come of a little over $19,000 per each of the tax years.
After first stating that it was willing to take the innocent spouse
claimant's word that she had no actual knowledge of the misappro-
priated money, the Tax Court went on to consider whether the
claimant had reason to know of the unreported income. The court
examined the claimant's standard of living in relation to those of the
community. The bank's vice president and major shareholder, who
was a neighbor of petitioners, testified that he never thought that
the family spent more than its income could justify. The govern-
ment's main contention was that the wife should have known some-
thing was amiss because expenses exceeded reported income." In
responding to this suggestion the court looked to the legislative
history of a related provision of section 6013(e) .1 The court noted
78. The Fifth Circuit rejected the test put forth by the government. The Service had
proposed that a spouse would be found to be without reason to know if "she was 'completely
without fault and could not possibly have discovered the omission before executing the
returns.' " Id. at 166, quoting Appellant's Brief at 17.
79. Id. at 169.
80. 57 T.C. 680 (1972).
81. For the four years in question, deposits totalled $40,011.91 and withdrawals totalled
$40,782.92.
82. 57 T.C. at 697.
83. I.R.C. § 6013 (e)(1)(C).
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that Congress intended that unreported income which was used for
"ordinary support" should not be treated as having benefited an
innocent spouse claimant. 4 Reasoning from the legislative intent on
this point the court ruled that it was "reasonable to conclude also
that such use of the unreported income does not ordinarily give the
spouse reason to know of the income's existence within the meaning
of the statute."" Thus, the innocent spouse claimant was held not
to be on inquiry notice. It would seem now that the Tax Court has
made a new factor of use of the funds for ordinary support. It is
submitted, however, that this is merely a concommitant of the in-
quiry as to the presence of lavish or unusual expenditures. If there
are none, it would seem that the label would be expenses for "ordi-
nary support."
Raymond H. Adams" added another factor-"forthrightness"
of the guilty spouse. Here the husband was the innocent spouse
claimant. His wife prepared the returns and had her own separate
income. She refused to show the innocent spouse claimant the re-
turns upon which she omitted income earned by her. Although he
had no actual knowledge of the omitted income, he "was put on
notice of the omissions by his former wife's refusal to be forthright
about the family income." 7 The court also assumed that the books
and records were at least available to him since he presented no
evidence to the contrary.
In analyzing the various factors, it becomes apparent that the
presence of different combinations at different times, when exam-
ined by different courts, makes prediction very difficult. Only one
factor taken alone will invariably lead to a finding of reason to know:
that is, when the innocent spouse claimant is totally involved or at
least actively participating.
In Quinn v. Commissioner,88 for example, the claimant's hus-
band fraudulently acquired $500,000 which was not declared as in-
come. The husband was the sole beneficiary of a trust which had
title to real estate occupied by a savings and loan association of
whose board of directors the husband was chairman. The innocent
spouse claimant was a member of the board and a senior vice presi-
dent. The husband's request for an advance payment of rent by the
savings and loan associaton was rejected. Nevertheless, he secured
from the association a check for an amount in excess of $500,000.
84. 57 T.C. at 698, citing S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
85. Id. See also Sam Shapolsky, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1972). The interrelationship
between significant benefit and knowledge is discussed in great detail in section V.D. infra.
86. 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
87. Id. at 303.
88. 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975).
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As a second basis for its denial of the innocent spouse claim,
the court concluded that the wife had reason to know. 9 The inno-
cent spouse claimant "had every reason to know that [her hus-
band] received the advance rental payment. She attended several
board meetings where it was discussed; and explanation of the item
was contained on the return she signed even though the amount was
not included in taxable income."9
In Louis Most,9 the wife who claimed to be an innocent spouse
under section 6013(e) worked in her husband's office from time to
time. There she met a client on several occasions who was suing her
husband for conversion. Active participation in her husband's busi-
ness led to 'denial of the innocent spouse claim through reason to
know."
If the claimant is a compensated treasurer of a corporation
which is a "family" business, reason to know easily will follow. 3 In
this situation, the claimant not only is an active member with ac-
cess to corporate books and records, but it is the claimant's duty to
be aware of the contents of those books.
Another important element is the complexity of the transaction
involved. In addition to the many complex business dealings which
require particular expertise to plan and carry out, many cases in-
volve white-collar crimes which are carefully thought out and often
evade discovery for several years. "The crime most often involved
is embezzlement, which generally cannot be detected without a con-
siderable amount of detailed investigation such as an audit by the
Service would trigger." Just as active participation should invaria-
bly lead to a finding of reason to know, the more complex the trans-
action and the more difficult it is for the Internal Revenue Service
to unravel the true nature of the transaction leading to omitted
income, the more ready courts should stand to grant relief where
this element is determinative. Perhaps this is in keeping with the
89. The first basis was the fact that there was no omission of greater than 25 percent of
the amount stated. On the return, reference was made to these funds as a loan from the
savings and loan.
90. 524 F.2d at 626.
91. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1972).
92. The case also involved the harsh placement of the burden of proof on the innocent
spouse claimant. Mrs. Most failed to take the stand and the court obviously was of the
opinion that this failure cannot ever satisfy the burden. "Her failure to testify creates the
normal inference that had she testified her testimony would have been unfavorable to her
position." 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1068.
93. Jerome J. Sonnenborn, 57 T.C. 373 (1971). The couple owned 100 percent of a corpo-
ration and received corporate checks far in excess of reported income.
94. Note, Innocent Spouses' Liability for Fraudulent Understatement of Taxable Income
on Joint Returns, 56 VA. L. REv. 1268, 1282 (1970).
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basic standard itself-the reasonable man test. The ordinary indi-
vidual should not have his business acumen equated with, say, the
average Internal Revenue Service Special Agent. The most distress-
ing fact is that this one factor is often overlooked by courts and it
is submitted that it should take on primary importance. In Robert
L. McCoy,"' the innocent spouse claimant's husband realized in-
come upon incorporation of a partnership whose liabilities exceeded
the adjusted basis of transferred assets. The petitioner was aware
of the existence of the partnership but she did not actively partici-
pate in the business. Likewise, she "perused" the return but did not
aid in its preparation. The claimant argued that, as a layman, she
was unaware of the tax consequences of incorporating the deficit
partnership, and since such transaction did not realize a gain in
cash she had no reason to know. This seems to be a perfect case for
stating that because of the complexity of the transaction, the
claimant had no reason to know of the omitted income.
The Tax Court in this case ignored this factor. "[M]ere igno-
rance" of the legal tax consequences of the transactions would not
relieve the spouse from liability." The court quoted from language
of Representative Byrnes, a floor manager of Pub. L. 91-679, to the
effect that "complete ignorance of the omission" is required. 7 This
is plainly at variance with other decisions which have concluded
that a spouse can have knowledge of some of the facts related to the
unreported income without being charged with knowledge of the
income itself. 8
Ultimately, each case is determined on its own facts. Courts
should not be too quick to make decisions based on the first factor
that appears to go against the innocent spouse claimant. All factors
should be considered. When they are not, the courts are not fulfill-
ing the Congressional intent of this "remedial" provision. The
courts should consider: (1) the extent .of any active participation
(e.g. Did the spouse work in the "business"?); (2) the degree to
which the claimant is involved in the "family finances" (Did the
claimant keep the books? Were there joint checking accounts?); (3)
the couple's standard of living, both historically and in relation to
others in the community; (4) The "subjective" condition of the
innocent spouse claimant (What is the level of education? Are there
any physical or emotional problems?); (5) the complexity of the
95. 57 T.C. 732 (1972).
96. Id. at 734.
97. Id. at 734-35, citing, 116 CONG. REC. 43351 (1970).
98. E.g., Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975); Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680
(1972).
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transaction (How long was the Service investigation?); (6) whether
expenses "greatly" exceed reported income; (7) whether the claim-
ant knew of any indictment or investigation.
IV. OMISSIONS-THE TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT RULE
A. Omissions
To be relieved from liability, it must be shown that there was
an "omission" from gross income of "an amount properly includable
therein."99 In practice, the meaning of the word "omission" in the
various cases is not at all as simple as it may seem. Because of the
specifics of section 6013(e), the determination is critical. A finding
of no omission ends the inquiry, regardless of whether there is
"knowledge" or any of the other elements is satisfied, even if it
would be "inequitable" to deny relief.
The most common claim that is denied is one where an inno-
cent spouse claimant asserts a belief that denial of a claim for a
deduction should qualify as an omission. The courts now hold uni-
formly that this is not the type of omission that is contemplated in
the Code.' 0 Since the deduction itself is on the return, it cannot be
said that the innocent spouse claimant did not have knowledge of
the omission.'0 '
There is an indication that if there is even the slightest refer-
ence to the income in question, the amount is not omitted. Estate
of Klein v. Commissioner"2 is an example of how extreme this may
be.
In Klein the parties stipulated that the wife-claimant met the
requirement of no knowledge and no significant benefit, and that it
would be inequitable to hold her liable. However, there had to be
an omission. "The applicability of [section 6013(e)] does not de-
pend entirely on the equities of each particular situation. Rather,
the innocent spouse must meet specific criteria in order to qualify
for this statutory protection."'' 3
The husband in Klein was a partner whose distributive share
of the net income of the partnership for the year in question was
approximately $90,845, as shown in the partnership return. On the
couple's joint return, he reported roughly $91,500. The amount
99. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A).
100. E.g., Estate of Klein v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1976); Gordon J. Hyde,
64 T.C. 300 (1975); William J. Jacobs, Jr., 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 379 (1974); Georgiana Spaulder,
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 723 (1972).
101. Georgiana Spaulder, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 723, 724 (1972).
102. 537 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 702.
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omitted from gros income in this case wag partly due to disallow-
ance of deductions of the partnership return.
The government contended, and the Tax Court agreed, 104 that
the joint return must be read as if it included the partnership re-
turn. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
also agreed and held that the amount is not omitted from gross
income stated in the return if it is disclosed in the return or in a
statement attached to the return in a "manner adequate to apprise
the Secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount of such
item."'05
The connection between the two returns cannot be of any lesser
nature than in this case. The Second Circuit's rationale stems from
''special rules" discussed later and the fact that Schedule H of the
Form 1040-labelled "Income from Partnerships, Estates, Trust
and Other Sources "-provides only one line for the amount. This,
in short, allows for reporting only a "net" figure. Given this limita-
tion, the court noted that the form does not in any way intend to
show the taxpayer's gross income when a taxpayer has partnership
income. The court therefore held that in this case the partnership
return must be considered as part of the personal income tax return.
In the usual case, it is easy to see that a deduction disallowance
has nothing whatsoever to do with whether an amount was omitted
from gross income, which is the area of primary focus of section
6013(e). 1°0 The Fifth Circuit has recently discussed this issue:
Of course, all errors made by the taxpayer, whether they result
in an upward or downward adjustment, must be balanced to-
gether in determining the income tax deficiency due. But it is
only one variety of error, an omission, to which section 6013(e)
may apply. In determining whether the quantity of the error is
great enough to justify innocent spouse relief . . . only errors of
omission should enter the computation. 7
It is submitted that this is an inequitable but unavoidable reading
of section 6013(e)(1)(A). It is true that deductions have nothing to
do with gross income "stated in the return" and the court's conclu-
sion that this does not qualify as an omission is not disputed. Fur-
thermore, actual omissions may not qualify the innocent spouse for
relief. In the cases of Quinn v. Commissioner'8 and Klein v.
Commissioner'" where the alleged omissions were from loans listed
104. 63 T.C. 585 (1975).
105. 537 F.2d at 705, quoting I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).
106. See S. REP. No. 91-1537; 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
107. Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975).
109. 537 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1976).
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elsewhere and from disallowed deductions on a return other than the
joint return, the courts denied relief to the taxpayer. A close look
at section 6013(e) shows that the omission from gross income refers
to the joint return, not to anything extraneous. Likewise, by strict
construction, omission must be from gross income, not from the
return as was the case in Quinn. Confusion may stem from the
concluding phrase "stated in the return." But this again refers to
gross income, not anything extraneous thereto.
Furthermore, the "special rules"'' 0 state that the amount in
question shall be determined in accordance with the procedures of
section 6501(e)(1)(A)."' In pertinent part, this section states that:
In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there
shall not be taken into account any amount which is omitted
from gross income stated in the return if such amount is disclosed
in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a
manner adequate to appraise the secretary of the nature and
amount of such item. 12
This reference is unfortunate because the main thrust of the
section is concerned with relief for an "innocent spouse." The
knowledge of an innocent spouse claimant should be important in
determining "equitable" relief under subsection (B), not the knowl-
edge of the IRS. The remedial purposes of this provision can be
frustrated by a strict construction.
In Norman Rodman, "' the omission from gross income resulted
from an error in computation of cost of goods sold. Again the special
rule in section 6013(e)(2)(B), which points to section 6501(e)(1)(A),
precluded relief as an innocent spouse."' "[A]n error in the cost of
goods sold is not the equivalent of an omission from gross income
within the meaning of such term.""' 5
B. The Twenty-Five Percent Rule
Even if the amount is properly determined as an omission, such
amount must be "in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return.""' 6 Failure to attain this minimum level
110. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2).
111. Id.
112. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
113. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1973).
114. "In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross income' means the total of the
amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services ... prior to diminution by
the cost of such sales or services." I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
115. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1320.
116. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A).
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can come from a failure to exclude a large amount, for example,
omitting embezzled funds. Thus, minor errors by those of relatively
low incomes may go without relief. On its face, this appears discrim-
inatory and not at all in keeping with the basic remedial nature of
the statute."7 It is not surprising that this particular element has
come under attack on constitutional grounds. Constitutional chal-
lenges to the sections of the Internal Revenue Code seem doomed
to defeat, however."'
In Quinn v. Commissioner,"9 the court referred to fraudulently
acquired funds in the joint return as loans. The innocent spouse
claimant argued that if section 6013(e) did not protect her, it was
an unconstitutional violation of the fifth amendment as it deprived
her of property without due process of law. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that in order to obtain
relief under this argument the taxpayer must not only show that the
conditions placed on the relief are unconstitutional, but also that
relief is constitutionally required. The reason stated was that sec-
tion 6013(e) essentially is a "relief" provision and that but for this
section, the taxpayer would be liable in any event. The taxpayer
could not, of course, overcome this barrier imposed by the court.
The authors submit that this twenty-five percent threshold re-
quirement should be deleted from the Code. One of the stated
purposes for this requirement was an interest in judicial economy.
It was thought that only where omitted income represents a signifi-
cant amount should relief be provided. 2 ' On the other hand, the me-
chanical application of this requirement will lead, and has led, to
unjust results where an innocent spouse claimant meets all other
requirements including that of an otherwise "inequitable" result.'2'
The twenty-five percent requirement is not needed to deter the
bringing of petitions involving relatively insignificant amounts. As
a general rule, "cases involving small dollar amounts will not be
worth taking up on appeal."'2 2 Perhaps the basic impediment to
117. The statute was enacted to remedy specific inequities. S. REP. No. 15-1537, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975); Sanders
v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
118. For example, in Mary Lou Galliher, 62 T.C. 760 (1974), the innocent spouse claim-
ant challenged the differing tax treatments which arise by virtue of the community property
laws of some states. The court dismissed this argument by noting that "the Supreme Court
long ago upheld the constitutionality of distinctions arising from community property laws."
Id. at 763 (citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117, 118 (1930)).
119. 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975).
120. S. REP. No. 91-1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
121. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C); see, e.g., Wissing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir.
1971).
122. Comment, The Innocent Spouse Act, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 448, 459 (1972).
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reform in this area is the widely accepted notion that the Tax Code
was just not meant to aid the average wage-earner.
V. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 6013(e)(1)(C)
Section 6013(e)(1)(C) of the Innocent Spouse Act sets forth the
"final" package of elements and tests which must be satisfied if one
is to prove he or she is an "innocent spouse" and thus be relieved
from liability for the deficiency in tax attributable to an omission
of income on the joint return.'23 It is in this subsection that Congress
has truly responded to the cry from the courts to provide them with
a means for ending the harsh and inequitable consequences which
they were obliged to impose upon innocent spouses, merely because
the spouse had executed a joint return upon which the spouse's
mate failed to report all income."' Therefore, although this subsec-
tion provides the "final" set of requirements which the spouse must
satisfy if she is to be granted relief, it is nevertheless the foundation
of the entire Act and should be given the maximum attention by the
courts.
The ultimate determination to be made under section
6013(e)(1)(C) is whether it is inequitable to hold the other spouse
liable for the deficiency in tax. In making this determination, the
court is to take into account: a) whether or not the other spouse
significantly benefited from the omissions of income; and b) all
other facts and circumstances.
123. I.R.C., § 6013(e)(1)(C) provides that the spouse is relieved of liability if
(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse significantly benefited
directly or indirectly from items omitted from gross income and taking into ac-
count all other facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other spouse
liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such omission.
124. The Senate Committee on Finance stated as its reason for recommending the pas-
sage of H.R. 19774 (Innocent Spouse Provisions) the fact that "numerous cases have arisen
which the imposition of joint liability upon an innocent spouse has resulted in the commit-
tee's opinion grave injustice." S. REP. No. 1537; 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). [Hereinafter
referred to as S. REP. No. 91-1537.]
In Louise M. Scudder, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967), the petitioner's husband embezzled funds
from a partnership. The petitioner neither knew of, nor benefited from these funds, yet the
statute precluded the court from granting her relief. Under these circumstances, the Court
felt compelled to state:
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and are
appalled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the inflexible statute
leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that only remedial legislation can
soften the impact of the rule of strict liability for income taxes on the many
married women who are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by filing joint
returns.
The Senate Finance Committee cited the Scudder case, as an example and stated: "This
proposal seeks to correct the unfairness in the situations brought to the attention of this
committee and to bring government tax collection practices into accord with basic principles
of equity and fairness." S. REP. No. 91-1537 at 2.
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A. Significant Benefit
"[W]hether or not the other spouse significantly benefited di-
rectly or indirectly from the items omitted from gross income" is set
out in the Code merely as an element to be considered by the tri-
bunal in making the ultimate determination whether it is inequita-
ble to hold the spouse liable for omitted income. '25 Rather than treat
the significant benefit test as one of a number of factors to be exam-
ined, the courts have generally treated it as the ultimate answer to
the question of liability. It is not unusual for a court to make a
finding of significant benefit and then fail to mention whether the
imposition of liability is equitable.'25 It appears, therefore, that the
majority of the courts treat a determination of significant benefit as
synonymous with a determination that it is not inequitable to hold
the spouse liable.
The significant benefit doctrine has proven to be a vague con-
cept which neither Congress nor the courts have been able to define
uniformly. The Senate Committee on Finance defined "significant
benefit" as not including the ordinary support of the innocent
spouse. However, unusual support or transfers of property to the
spouse would constitute "benefit."' 27
While the terms "ordinary" and "unusual support" are open to
a wide range of interpretation, the courts, in the spirit set forth by
the Tax Court in Sanders v. United States,"'2 have been flexible in
their construction. In the Sanders case the court noted that
"Congress intended the exception [§ 6013(e)] to remedy a per-
ceived injustice, and we should not hinder that praiseworthy intent
by giving the exception an unduly or restrictive reading."'' 9 There-
fore, the cases which have indulged in a detailed factual analysis to
determine whether the petitioner has received a "significant bene-
fit" have, in fact, applied relief liberally.""°
125. Whether it is inequitable to hold a person liable for the deficiency in tax
... is to be determined on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. In making
such a determination a factor to be considered is whether the person seeking relief
significantly benefited, directly or indirectly, from the items omitted from gross
income ...
Tress. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b)(1974).
126. See Wissing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971); Blaine S. Fox, 61 T.C.
704 (1974); Georgiana Spaulder, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 723 (1972); Louis Most, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
1062 (1972).
127. S. REP. No. 91-1537 at 3. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) ("normal support is not a
significant benefit for purposes of this determination"); H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1970).
128. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 166-67.
130. See Saunders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975); Dakil v. United States,
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The Tax Court, in one of the first cases to examine "significant
benefit,"'"' held that the petitioner did not significantly benefit
from over $100,000 of unreported income which the petitioner's
spouse embezzled over a four year period. The Internal Revenue
Service, offering the following figures, contended that because the
unreported income was more than 139% greater than the reported
income and the total expenditures exceeded by over $100,000 the
total reported income, the petitioner had to have received a signifi-
cant benefit.'
Rejectin'g the government's argument and disregarding the
additional facts that the petitioner and her spouse spent the unre-
ported income for two of their three sons' college educations, five
cars (including a Jaguar), a diamond ring, furniture and monthly
mortgage payments on their home, the Mysse court determined that
"[any benefit which [petitioner] received from the funds consti-
tuted no more than ordinary support."'33
The court while noting that a spouse "cannot close her eyes to
unusual or lavish expenditures," decided that "in this case, we find
no lavish expenditures."'34 Since ordinary support does not consti-
tute a significant benefit, the petitioner was relieved.'35
496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975); Jennie Allen,
61 T.C. 125 (1973); Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680 (1972); Sam Shapolsky, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
260 (1972).
131. Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680 (1972). See also Sam Shopolsky, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
(1972), where the court held that funds received by the petitioners as housewife and mother
were no more than normal support.
132. Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680, 697 (1972). The income and expenditure figures for
the relevant years are as follows:
Expenditures
in Excess of
Income Income Total Reported
Reported Unreported Expenditures Income
1963 $ 20,025.26 $ 8,079.10 $ 14,725.15 $( 5,300.11)
1964 19,811.48 17,000.00 24,960.88 5,149.40
1965 20,281.58 45,295.58 23,634.47 3,352.89
1966 16,525.32 36,501.18 24,612.94 8,087.59
Total $ 76,643.64 $106,875.86 $ 87,933.44 $ 11,289.80
133. Id. at 699. The court appeared to be influenced by two additional factors. First, the
petitioner's spouse was suffering from a terminal illness and subsequently committed suicide.
Second, the spending habits of the petitioner did not raise the suspicion of neighbors or
employers.
134. Id.
135. But see Louis Most, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1972); Georgiana Spaulder, 31 T.C.M.
(CCH) 723 (1972). In Most, it was held that because the petitioner used some of the unre-
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The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee,' 3 in
addition to recognizing that ordinary support does not constitute
benefit, also provided that unusual transfers of property to the
spouse should be taken into consideration in determining whether
the spouse benefited from items omitted from gross income. The
court in Jennie Allen'37 construed the House Report to mean that
"in order for [the court] to conclude that the petitioner benefited
significantly, [it] must find that petitioner received some benefit
in addition to ordinary support."'3
In Jennie Allen, the petitioner, upon divorcing her spouse, re-
ceived under the property settlement, a house, furniture, a used
Cadillac, five horses, a $2,000 promissory note, and stock in a life
insurance company. The government contended that receipt of the
above assets were unusual transfers which constituted a significant
benefit to the spouse. The court recognized, however, that the assets
carried with them corresponding liabilities, such as mortgage pay-
ments on the house, and upkeep on the cars and horses. The court,
noting also that the husband had failed to make the $150 per month
support payments under the terms of the divorce decree and that
the property had been accumulated over 24 years of marriage, held
that the value of transferred property was not so great as to be
considered unusual. 39
The Tax Court in Patricia S. Hayes,'" under a similar set of
facts, reached a similar conclusion. The petitioner was being held
accountable for income omitted from the joint return by her hus-
band during the years 1963, 1964, and 1965. In 1971, the petitioner
divorced her husband and pursuant to that divorce received the
family residence. The government argued that during the years in
question mortgage payments on the marital home were made with
the unreported income. The court held that the petitioner had not
benefited significantly, stating: "The mere fact that on her divorce
she received their home upon which mortgage payments had been
made during these years, will not cause this requirement to
ported income for personal living expenses, he significantly benefited. In Spaulder, the court
stated that since the petitioner's spouse provided support for the family it could not be said
that the petitioner did not benefit.
136. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970).
137. 61 T.C. 125 (1973).
138. Id. at 131.
139. Id. See Ann J. Anderson, 34 T.C.M. 508, 514 (1975). "The transfers of the household
furniture and the 1967 Chevrolet, pursuant to the separation agreement, constitute no more
than ordinary support and must be weighed against the factors of divorce and the absence of
alimony payable to petitioner."
140. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975).
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fail. . . . At most these payments were in the nature of 'normal
support.' "
While the courts in Allen and Hayes were unable to hold that
upon divorce the transfers of property to the petitioners conferred a
significant benefit, divorce can be the means by which liability
unwittingly is placed on the spouse. In Raymond H. Adams,'42 the
husband contended that he was an innocent spouse. During the
marriage from 1956 to 1961 the wife had omitted income which
increased her net worth by $286,990. While the husband-petitioner
did not benefit from these funds during the marriage, upon divorce
he received assets pursuant to the property settlement valued at
$257,000. In view of the fact that prior thereto his net worth was
$33,000, the court in Adams held that he significantly benefited
from the income omitted during the marriage year.'43
In Dakil v. United States'4 the Service raised the question
whether the fact that the petitioner engaged in a "luxurious life-
style" was a sufficient basis from which to infer that the spouse had
significantly benefited. Here the government claimed that the own-
ership of three cars, country club memberships, vacation trips, pri-
vate schools for the children, and house remodeling disclosed a life-
style sufficiently luxurious to compel a finding that the petitioner
had benefited significantly. The Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the record did not disclose the difference between a luxurious
lifestyle and ordinary support for a doctor's wife.' This statement
infers that a showing by the Service that the petitioner leads a
luxurious lifestyle is not proof of a significant benefit from omitted
income; rather, the court must determine whether the petitioner,
prior to the receipt of the unreported income, was accustomed to a
luxurious lifestyle. Thus, the courts cannot find that the petitioner
derived a significant benefit from the omitted income unless they
find that "but for" the unreported income, the petitioner would
have been unable to make the expenditures necessary to maintain
the luxurious lifestyle. This "but for" approach is a valid and neces-
sary test which all courts should apply in making a determination
of significant benefit.
The "but for" approach was applied by the court in Clarence
E. Haywood."'4 In Haywood, the petitioner's spouse had embezzled
$106,100 over a four year period. During these years, the petitioner
141. Id. at 981.
142. 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
143. Id. at 303-04.
144. 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974).
145. Id. at 433.
146. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1974).
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and her spouse went on numerous gambling sprees to Las Vegas,
took vacations, frequented casinos and bars, and bought a cruiser.
The court stated as its reason for holding the petitioner significantly
benefited that: "[P]etitioner presented no records to support her
contention that the family income, aside from the embezzled sums,
was adequate to meet their style of living ... .
An express adoption by the courts of the "but for" test would
provide them with an efficient, fair, consistent and effective method
for properly analyzing whether the petitioner realized a significant
benefit from unreported funds. 48
B. Inequitableness
In numerous cases, the courts, upon finding that the petitioner
"significantly benefited," have concluded prematurely that the pe-
titioner could be deni'ed relief for failing to satisfy subsection
6013(e)(1)(C) of the innocent spouse provision.' The major ques-
tion raised by subsection (1)(C), however, is whether it is inequita-
ble to hold the petitioner liable.' Therefore, significant benefit is
only one factor to be considered in answering that question because
"[w]hether it is inequitable to hold a person liable for the defi-
ciency in tax . . . is to be determined on the basis of all facts and
circumstances. "5
The court in Dakil v. United States' recognizing the distinc-
tion between a determination of significant benefit and a determi-
nation that it is inequitable to hold the petitioner liable, ruled that
"significant benefit is not determinative if all other facts and cir-
cumstances make the imposition of the tax inequitable."'53 In apply-
147. Id. at 1316.
148. The "but for" test would also bury the inconsistent contention often made by
Internal Revenue Service agents and conferees that since the unreported income constituted
more than twenty-five percent of the reported income, the petitioner has benefited signifi-
cantly from the omitted funds. Upon first consideration, this argument sounds plausible,
however, it is totally inconsistent with the intent of subsection 6013(e)(1)(A) to limit relief
to cases where the income omitted represents a significant amount. According to the govern-
ment's contention, any petitioner who satisfied the twenty-five percent rule, thus qualifying
for relief under 6013(e)(1)(A) would thereafter be denied relief. This would render the Inno-
cent Spouse provision totally useless.
149. See Clarence E. Haywood, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1974); Cecelia M. Harmon, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1974); Raymond H. Adams, 60 T.C. 300 (1973); Louis Most, 31 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1062 (1972); Georgiana Spaulder, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 723 (1972).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(a)(4) (1960).
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (1960).
152. 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974).
153. Id. at 433. See Sam Shapolsky, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1972). In Shapolsky, the
court stated: "The [Congressional] reports make it clear that to determine that it would be
equitable to hold the spouse liable. . . we must find at the very least that the innocent spouse
significantly benefited from the omission." Id. at 261.
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ing that principle to the case at hand, the Dakil court continued:
"Even if [the benefits are significant] the overwhelming considera-
tions require that the unnecessarily harsh attempt to collect from
her individually the tax liabilities of her husband should never have
been made. . . . Even a tax collector should have some heart.''5
In Bettye A. Sanders, 5 5 due consideration was given to the fact
that the petitioner would suffer hardship in the future if relief were
denied her. In holding that a mere finding that the petitioner bene-
fited will not be sufficient, the court rejected the government's as-
sertion that the future hardship which the petitioner may be ex-
posed to is not a proper factor for consideration if the petitioner has
retained either unreported income or the fruits of the unreported
income which could have been used to discharge the liability.'5
Noting that all facts and circumstances are to be taken into account
the court stated: "[Niothing in the statute or its legislative history
purports to forbid the consideration of probable future hardship
when examining the equities of the case."'' 57
Divorce, separation and desertion are significant factors which
have also influenced the determination of whether it was inequita-
ble to hold the petitioner liable.' 8 In Patricia E. Mysse, 5 the gov-
ernment, pointing to petitioner's harmonious marriage, argued that
relief was intended primarily for the benefit of spouses who were
deserted, divorced or separated. The court properly held that there
is nothing in the innocent spouse provision which indicates that
relief is limited "to spouses who are victims of broken marriages.
Indeed, . . . whether the innocent spouse has been separated or
divorced is only one of the factors to be considered in determining
whether it is inequitable to hold her liable for deficiencies."'' 0
154. 496 F.2d at 433.
155. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975). The Sanders court stated that "[Tihe presence of
significant benefits from the unreported income [is] only one factor in the overall decision
of whether it is inequitable to charge the spouse with the tax." Id. at 171 n.16.
156. Id. at 171 n.16, citing Appellant's Brief at 18. The government argued that the fact
that Mrs. Sanders received proceeds from an insurance policy that increased in value from
$50,000.00 to $145,000.00 during the period her husband omitted income and proceeds from
the sale of property acquired also during that period, were sufficient to deny her relief. It
appears that the government was relying on Treasury Regulation Section 1.6013-5(b) (1960)
which states in part: "[lf a person seeking relief receives from his spouse an inheritance of
property or life insurance proceeds which are traceable to items omitted from gross income
by his spouse, that person will be considered to have benefited from those items."
157. 509 F.2d at 171 n.16.
158. Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975); Jennie Allen, 61 T.C. 125 (1973);
Raymond H. Adams, 60 T.C. 300 (1973); Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680 (1972); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6013-5(b) (1960) which states in part: "Other factors which may also be taken into
account, if the situation warrants, include the fact that the person seeking relief has been
deserted by his spouse or the fact that he has been divorced or separated from his spouse."
159. 57 T.C. 680, 699 (1972).
160. Id. at 700. In Mysse, the fact that the petitioner's husband was insolvent at death
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In summary, Congress intended subsection (1)(C) to serve as
the ultimate safety valve by which the innocent spouse could be
relieved of tax liability for income omitted from a joint return.
Therefore, the statute permits, indeed requires, the courts to give
full consideration to all the facts and circumstances bearing upon
the determination of whether or not it would be inequitable to hold
the petitioner liable. Although Congress intended subsection (1)(C)
of the innocent spouse provision to provide relief to the innocent
spouse when the equities necessitated relief, an innocent spouse
may be unduly subjected to liability under subsection (1)(B),
which precludes relief if the claimant fails to prove that she had
no reason to know of omitted income. Therefore, relief may be
ultimately denied, regardless of the fact that it may be inequitable
to hold the innocent spouse liable.
C. Dependency Theory
A survey of the cases which have determined whether or not to
grant relief pursuant to the innocent spouse provision of the Internal
Revenue Code has indicated that the key to achieving relief is to
convince the court that the petitioner did not know and had no
reason to know that income had been omitted from the joint return.
There is a significant interdependence between subsection (1)(B),
which requires that the petitioner prove she had no reason to know
income was unreported,'"' and subsection (1)(C), which requires
that the petitioner show she did not significantly benefit from the
omitted funds and that it would be inequitable to hold her liable.'
The above mentioned survey indicates that where a finding
that the petitioner had significantly benefited was the only means
by which the courts could deny the petitioner relief, the courts have
uniformly refused to find that the unreported income constituted a
significant benefit.'63 In fact, the courts at times have engaged in
legal gymnastics to reach the conclusion that the use of the omitted
was another factor which influenced the court's determination that it was inequitable to hold
the petitioner liable.
161. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B); Jerome J. Sonnenborn, 57 T.C. 373 (1971); Nathaniel M.
Stone, 56 T.C. 213 (1971).
162. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C).
163. In many cases which have held that the petitioner had no reasn to know income
was omitted, the courts found that the petitioner realized no significant benefit and that it
was inequitable to hold the petitioner liable. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th
Cir. 1975); Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); Wissing v. Commissioner,
441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Davis, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 6075 (D. Ariz. 1971);
Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975); Jennie Allen, 61 T.C. 125 (1973); Patricia
E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680 (1972); Sam Shapolsky, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1972). But see Danied
Cecere, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1975).
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income constituted nothing more than normal support.' 4 On the.
other hand, where it has been determined that the petitioner did
know or have reason to know that income had not been reported,
the courts have not hestitated to deny the petitioner relief.'65
The requirements which the petitioner must satisfy to be
granted relief under the innocent spouse provision cannot be consid-
ered to be independent of one another. In the great majority of the
cases the courts' determination of whether or not it is equitable to
hold the petitioner liable turns, in fact, on whether or not the peti-
tioner is found to have knowledge or reason to know of omitted
income. Furthermore, whether a petitioner had reason to know fre-
quently turns on whether there was more than normal support.
Congress intended the innocent spouse provision to provide re-
lief, where warranted by the equities, from liability arising from the
filing of a joint return.'" Subsection 6013(e) fails to achieve its equi-
table purpose where the claimant is unable to satisfy the require-
ments of paragraph (1)(B). In these situations relief is denied even
though it is otherwise inequitable to hold the spouse liable. Thus,
injustices continue and the Congressional intent is frustrated.
To remedy this dilemma, and to reflect the true Congressional
intent underlying the passage of the innocent spouse provision,
subsection (1)(B) should be incorporated into subsection (1)(C). It
should be one factor to be taken into account, along with the ques-
tion of significant benefit to the innocent spouse and all the other
facts and circumstances. All of these factors go to the making of the
ultimate and most important determination: whether it is inequita-
ble to hold the petitioner liable for the deficiency in tax attributable
to unreported income.
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF
In determining any controversy the placing of the burden of
proof is of utmost importance in arriving at a conclusion. Except for
subsection (B) of section 6013(e)(1),'"7 the innocent spouse provision
164. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
165. In the nine cases which have held that the petitioner knew or had reason to know
income had been omitted, eight of these also held that the petitioner had significantly bene-
fited from these funds. Blaine S. Fox, 61 T.C. 704 (1974); Clarence E. Haywood, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1311 (1974); Cecelia M. Harmon, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1974); Raymond H. Adams,
60 T.C. 300 (1973); Robert L. McCoy, 57 T.C. 732 (1972); Georgiana Spaulder, 31 T.C.M.
(CCH) 723 (1972); Louis Most, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1972); Jerome J. Sonnenborn, 57 T.C.
373 (1971). But see Ann J. Anderson, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1975).
166. See discussion in text accompanying note 124 supra.
167. The innocent spouse claimant will be relieved if he/she "establishes that in signing
the return, he or she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission. .. .
I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B).
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does not allocate this burden. Although it appeared to some that the
Internal Revenue Service bore the initial burden of proving that the
innocent spouse claimant had "significantly benefited" from omit-
ted income," 8 the cases reveal that the burden of proof as to all
elements of the section rests upon the innocent spouse claimant.'
This, of course, specifically includes the element of no significant
benefit. 70
The difficulty here is determining what quantum will satisfy
the factual determination'7' in any given case. At the very least, it
is suggested that the innocent spouse claimant should take the
stand and present his or her side of the story.
When the claimant fails to take the stand, besides leaving the
impression of no affirmative action, he or she creates a negative
inference in the fact finder's mind. The innocent spouse claimant's
"failure to testify creates the normal inference that had she testified
her testimony would have been unfavorable to her position."'7 The
Tax Court will not assume that there is no knowledge or significant
benefit.'
When the innocent spouse claimant takes the stand, on the
other hand, many courts are willing to take his or her testimony at
face value. 7' This is particularly true when the initial issue of actual
knowledge is presented. In Ann J. Anderson, "I for example, the Tax
Court relied on Mrs. Anderson's testimony that she had no actual
knowledge of her husband's embezzling of funds. "Considering the
direct testimony on this point by both petitioner and [her hus-
band] we believe petitioner has established that she did not have
actual knowledge of the omission when she signed the 1969 re-
turn."'76 The court's faith in Mrs. Anderson's testimony continued
as to actual knowledge in the subsequent year even though her
"guilty" spouse was indicted for his illegal activities.'77
Similar faith was shown in Cain v. Commissioner' and Sam
168. Comment, supra note 121, at 456.
169. E.g., Doris Swofford, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 691, 694 (1975); Ann J. Anderson, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 508, 512 (1975).
170. Louis Most, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1972); Herbert C. McManus, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
999 (1972).
171. Note, The Joint Tax Return and the Innocent Spouse, 10 J. FAMILY L. 472, 477
(1971).
172. Louis Most, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062, 1068 (1972).
173. Jerome J. Sonnenborn, 557 T.C. 373 (1971). See also Blaine S. Fox, 61 T.C. 704
(1974).
174. E.g., Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975).
175. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1975).
176. Id. at 513. See also Patricia S. Hayes, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (1975).
177. Id. at 514.
178. 460 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Shapolsky.'7 In Cain, the claimant's husband, a government em-
ployee, received "kickbacks" from construction companies. In af-
firming the Tax Court's decision,'80 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit was satisfied that the wife had testified
"to the best of her knowledge." In Shapolsky, the omissions resulted
from income attributable to the "guilty husband's" business. The
court held that Mrs. Shapolsky had met her burden of proof as to
both actual knowledge and reason to know. "[Her] testimony and
the facts and circumstances as revealed in the entire record are
sufficient to meet this burden."''
Nevertheless, the advocate must use caution because the ques-
tion is essentially factual and the testimony may not be convincing
in all cases. In Clarence E. Haywood,'2 for example, the active
participation overrode the testimony of the innocent spouse claim-
ant that she had not significantly benefited from her husband's
other sources of income. More was needed.
The only evidence offered to show no significant benefit was
vague and general testimony at trial from several neighbors and
acquaintances that petitioner's standard of living was not notice-
ably higher. . . .This is not of itself sufficient to meet her bur-
den of proof. . . .[Pletitioner presented no records to support
her contention that the family income, aside from the embezzled
sums, was adequate to meet their style of living, including trips
to Nevada.' 3
The innocent spouse claimant's testimony will be believed only
in the initial stages of the inquiry to establish no actual knowledge.
When the latter elements are considered, more is needed and the
factors discussed above' 4 can overcome the direct testimony no
matter how convincing. The main problem with the positioning of
the burden of proof in this section is the inherent difficulty in trying
to prove a negative. The innocent spouse claimant must prove that
he or she had no actual knowledge, no reason to know, and that he
or she did not significantly benefit from the omitted funds. A total
179. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1972).
180. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 197 (1971).
181. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) at 261. See also Patricia E. Mysse, 57 T.C. 680 (1972). As an aside
in Mysse, the Service argued that the innocent spouse section was intended to protect only
those spouses who have become separated from or divorced from the "guilty" spouse. The
court rejected this limitation: "We find nothing in the section, however, to indicate that its
relief was intended to be limited to spouses who are victims of broken marriages." 57 T.C. at
700.
182. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1311 (1974).
183. Id. at 1316.
184. See part III. B. supra.
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remedy of an inequitable situation cannot be had without a restruc-
turing of the awesome burden of proof.
The penalty provisions for fraud are not imposed upon the
"innocent spouse" unless the government can prove that the claim-
ant actively participated in the fraud.' With regard to section
6013(e), there is no reason why a similar burden cannot be placed
upon the government. Thus, the innocent spouse provision would
not apply to "perfect" spouses only.
VII. CONCLUSION
The innocent spouse provision was enacted to remedy existing
inequities in the area of joint and several liability. Basic inequities
can still be seen in the case law which has developed since subsec-
tion 6013(e) was enacted. To the extent these inequities exist, the
reform has failed.
Existing inequities can be resolved by taking several steps.
First, the twenty-five percent requirement of subparagraph (1)(A)
should be eliminated. On its face, it is discriminatory. Addition-
ally, the discouragement of relatively insignificant cases is not a
real problem since "insignificant," in a sense, means that the suit
is not worth bringing in the first place. In any event, judicial econ-
omy should not outweigh equal treatment when all else is "equal."
The requirement of filing a joint return may require adjust-
ment, particularly in light of some of the community property cases
that have dealt with innocent spouse treatment. Perhaps the fairest
measure would be to limit the threshold requirement to having
omitted income attributable to the guilty spouse. But for their state
of residence, many innocent spouses would not incur liability in the
first instance. It seems fair, then, that they should have at least an
equal opportunity for relief as spouses in noncommunity property
states.
A major inequity stems from the placing of the burden of proof.
Proving negatives is hard enough, but when coupled with the vast
difference in investigative capabilities, it almost becomes insur-
mountable. As in the fraud relief provision, greater fairness would
result from shifting the burden to the government to prove actual
knowledge, reason to know or a definite significant benefit.
Finally, subparagraph (1)(B)'s lack of knowledge requirement
should be merged with (C). In this manner, true equities can be seen
as overriding unfortunate situations where the innocent spouse
185. I.R.C. § 6653(b); see Daniel Cecere, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1975); Nathaniel M.
Stone, 56 T.C. 213 (1971).
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claimant is automatically precluded from relief by a determination
of "reason to know" based upon spurious or relatively innocuous
factors.
The ultimate effect of these proposals will be to further the
congressional intent manifest in subsection 6013(e). This effect will
be in keeping with the judicial trend which was the impetus to
action by Congress. Thus, these proposals will bring about the equi-
table results which subsection 6013(e) was intended to achieve.
